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War has always been understood as an essentially two-sided affair. Clausewitz characterised war as a 
duel, using the analogy of wrestlers trying to pin each other down. Whether as duel or as a wrestling 
match, either analogy that Clausewitz used nevertheless still envisaged war as a two-sided affair.1 
This image of war as a two-sided affair—whether as a duel or as a wrestling match—does not 
mean that wars have only two contending armed forces, or states for that matter. In the era of 21st 
Century nation-states, it is also means that other “interested parties” can become embroiled in the 
conflict. While this may seem counter-intuitive, the reason for this lies in the very malleability that lies at 
the heart of the ‘nation’. 
The nation is, as Benedict Anderson put it, an “imagined community”.2 Anderson later argues that 
this “imagined community” is amenable to manipulation by policy makers, and can incorporate “illiterates 
and populations with different mother-tongues” and that “nations can now be imagined without linguistic 
communality … out of a general awareness of what modern history has demonstrated to be possible.”3 
What strategic actors such as ISIS have managed to do is to create, in the words of Joel Kotkin, “an 
intrinsic ‘tribal’ sense of a unique historical and ethnic identity”.4 
The wars in Afghanistan, in the 1980s (when the former Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan, 
occupied it and subsequently imposed a puppet political regime in Kabul), and more recently when the 
United States and its coalition partners invaded Afghanistan to topple the Taliban and subsequently 
installed the Karzai regime. The war in Iraq, when the United States led a coalition into Iraq to topple the 
Saddam Hussein regime. The current civil war in Syria, and how it has morphed into a regional conflict, 
with a new strategic actor called ISIS/ISIL. 
What connects these various conflicts or “wars” is that they started with a particular set of 
combating parties, but somehow the number of combating parties appears to grow eventually. So what 
may have started out as a duel – to use Clausewitz’s image – eventually transformed into something more 
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akin to a street brawl. The Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan in December 1979, and eventually ended 
facing two main opposing forces – the Peshawar Seven and the Tehran Eight – who received backing from 
Pakistan and China in the first instance and Iran in the second. By the time the United States-led coalition 
invaded Afghanistan, new schisms had emerged, between the Taliban and the Northern Alliance. The 
United States and its coalition partners invaded Iraq in 2003, quickly disintegrated the Saddam Hussein 
regime and the Iraqi Armed Forces, but soon faced a domestic insurgency that appeared resisting the 
Coalition until Iraqi “honour” could be retrieved; nevertheless, this eventually transformed into any 
number of smaller splinter groups, sometimes fighting the Coalition, often fighting each other. How many 
non-Afghans and non-Iraqis moved to both conflict zones to fight their respective causes, who knows!!! 
How did this state of affairs emerge? Why is it so easy for an existing conflict to transform into 
something else, with multiple combating parties emerging apparently out of nowhere? 
The answer lies in the ubiquity of communications devices and platforms, which allow information 
to be broadcasted almost instantaneously. There were reportedly over 3 billion Internet users in 2014.5 
This represents an exponential increase of 741% of Internet users from 2000 and 2014.6  It is this ubiquity 
of access to information that allows for people otherwise widely dispersed and physically unconnected to 
an existing armed conflict to now feel connected, to want to ‘do something’ about this conflict. It is the 
war version of the flash mob. Even in the 1980s, at the height of the Soviet Union’s war in Afghanistan 
and long before ubiquitous communications, we saw Muslims from around making their respective 
journeys to Afghanistan to join the Mujahideen. ISIS today has amongst its ranks any number of people 
from outside the region, who have been inspired to join ISIS in their war. 
This, therefore, has implications for how defence planners ought to understand the nature and 
character of strategy. Clausewitz reminds us that war is fundamentally purposive in nature.7 Furthermore, 
war is “an act of force to compel our enemy to do our will.”8 It is an inherently dynamic process, one that 
involves the “collision of two living forces.”9 If war is a clash of wills, it is possible to deduce the real 
‘battlefield’ to always be the opponent’s will. At the strategic level, will is manifested typically in the 
political leadership and/or the hearts and minds of the population of the sides involved, and their 
respective willingness to endure the otherwise unendurable.  
At the operational and tactical levels, it is a matter of breaking the morale of the opposing troops. 
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It is at the operational level that the phenomenon being investigated here—the so-called strategic flash 
mob—where success can be increasingly problematic. However one defines and understands the nuts 
and bolts of strategy, it is clear that strategy is focused on the adversary, and only the adversary; strategy 
does not have to take into consideration any other actors, because of the two-sided nature of war. The 
objective of strategy is to defeat the enemy; the objective in war is to be able to convince the enemy that 
the political cause for which he fights is not attainable. But increasingly, strategists need to ask, “Who is 
the enemy?” Similarly, strategists need to ask, “What is the political purpose for which my enemy fights?” 
